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Different Images of the Future of the
Hungarian Communities in Neighbouring
Countries, 1989–2012
N A´NDOR B A´ R D I
Pilisszentiva´n, Aka´cfa u.18. H-2084, Hungary. E-mail: bardinandor@gmail.com
The paper offers a conceptual framework for interpreting the actions, rhetoric and
decisions of the Hungarian communities living in neighbouring countries. Its main topic
is covering how post-communist social transformations have been linked to the images
these different communities have of the future, including expectations, principles and
strategic goals.
1. Introduction
This essay intends to clarify concepts and relationships in a period in which the topic of
the Hungarians living in neighbouring countries is deﬁned by opportunistic symbolic
speech and rhetoric. In such a context, public discourse is interested in the symbolic
value of issues, and not in their historical, social, and economic connections. However,
one could argue that the analysis of concepts and self-reﬂections helps in returning
to interpretations based on dominant correlations. This paper intends to present the
intellectual background developed in Hungarian minority communities and in Hungary,
thus enabling a more meaningful interpretation of the actions, rhetoric and decisions of
the various actors. First, I will offer a deﬁnition of the Hungarian minority communities
involved. Then follows a presentation of the most important social changes that affected
these communities during the last two decades. The next section tries to answer the
following problem: why is Hungary interested in the Hungarian minority communities,
and how is this connected to its images of the future, respectively to the most important
expectations entertained by minority Hungarians. After an overview of the Hungarian
minorities policies elaborated by the post-1989 governments, the most important
principles and strategic goals of Hungarian politics will be presented. Finally, I will
address the following question: how is it possible that as part of the building of a
political community in Hungary, the cause of minority Hungarians was subordinated to
party politics?
2. A General Presentation of the Hungarian Minority Communities
The historical image of the Hungarian minority communities is based on the assumption
that they are the defensive, self-organising reactions to the challenges posed by nation-
states. As a result of the political decisions taken at the peace treaty of Trianon (1920), a
series of involuntary communities came into being, groups that were forcibly severed
from the process of Hungarian nation building. Within a generation, these became
regional communities of fate.1 The minority elites offer arguments and a framework of
socialisation to these newly formed communal self-identities. The key issue is that the
Hungarian minority communities are native in their regions. They deliberately stick to
the maintenance of their life-worlds. Their ‘integration’ is possible exactly as far as they
can feel at home in their place of residence. In the interbellum period, as against the
standardising ambitions of the nation states, the representatives of the communities under
consideration deﬁned the Hungarians living in Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia as
national minorities: members of a nation (in this case the Hungarian one) living as
minorities in another nation-state.2 A precondition of the integration of such separate
political entities would have been communal self-government, or at least the elimination
of linguistic, economic, and/or institutional discrimination. However, this did not happen.3
And up to the present day, majority societies consider the Hungarian minorities of Central
Europe as the remnants of historical Hungary, and treat them as imperial minorities
(or residual minorities). The defence of their positions, their self-organisation, and their
relations with the kin-state may evoke historical Hungary and may raise questions of security
policy. Consequently, a possible deﬁnition is the following: these are native minority
communities that claim the status of a national minority, and would like to build and
institutionalise their own parallel societies, while in their own countries they are considered
to be imperial/residual minorities, and as a result their activities in the ﬁeld of self-organisation,
and maintenance of cultural heritage are considered to raise problems of security.
Hungarian minorities are not ‘minority groups’, because they are not simply groups of
people speaking a particular language. They are communities with the consciousness of a
common cultural identity that were part of the Hungarian nation building process until
1918. Later the Hungarian minority elites, as organisers of their own societies, under-
stood their role to be that of nation builders.4 The expression ‘minority society’ is also
often used, since this is essentially the expectation, the goal of the minority elites.
However, the Hungarian minorities do not have a total, autonomous social institutional
subsystem. Consequently, it is more precise to speak of a Hungarian minority community
within each state.
Central European minorities can be divided (even if the division is not clear-cut) into
three groups.5 One consists of the national minorities: they have the consciousness of
belonging to a national community, and this is the most important element of their
national identity. One can include into this group the Hungarians of Romania, Slovakia,
Ukraine and Serbia, who consider (according to research and experience) that their
belonging to the Hungarian nation is primary.6 Another group consists of ethnic mino-
rities: these are communities that developed for a long time apart from their ethnocultural
or national communities, to which they are connected ﬁrst of all by a common origin
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and language. One can mention as part of this type most of the Hungarians in Croatia and
Slovenia, respectively an important part of the Gypsies in Hungary.7 The third group
consists of regional minorities: they already switched languages, have no sense of an
ethnic community, but they are conscious of an origin that is different from that of the
majority of the country they live in, and their identity is primarily connected to local
characteristics. This is the case with the Hungarians living in Burgenland (Austria), and
the majority of the minorities living in Hungary. Last but not least, one should not forget
a fourth category, consisting of the emigrants (migrant workers). Here one could think of
the Hungarian diasporas of Austria and Germany (approximately 200,000 people), and
an important part of the minorities in Hungary who were born in different countries.8
A concept already mentioned, the policy concerning Hungarians, is the governmental
policy of Budapest, Bucharest, Belgrade, and Prague/Bratislava targeting the Hungarians
who were attached to other countries in 1918. The political activity of Central European
minority elites is called minority politics. The policy concerning minorities refers to
the general politics of a government dealing with the national and ethnic minorities of the
respective state. The three together result in an ethnopolitical system of relationships.
In my view, the Hungarian minorities policy refers to the relationships between the
Hungarian state and the Hungarians living in neighbouring states. It encompasses the
following dimensions: international and bilateral minority protection; the institutional
Hungarian-Hungarian relationships between the kin-state and the Hungarian minorities;
the support of Hungarian minority communities. These policies can be further broken
down into the policies regulating the relationships between the Central European gov-
ernments and the respective Hungarian minorities as far as integration, language use and
institutional framework is concerned.
Basically, one is considered a Hungarian according to one’s self-classiﬁcation. At the
same time, there are people who are of Hungarian origin, but do not speak Hungarian,
and people who know the language, but are not of Hungarian origin. As a result, there are
‘Hungarians’ who assume not only a Hungarian cultural and national identity, but have
other ties as well. This is particularly true in the case of the ethnic and national minorities
of Hungary, since in addition to the Hungarian ethno-cultural community, the totality of
Hungarian citizens is considered to be part of the Hungarian nation as well. So, public
opinion considers to be part of the Hungarian nation both the minorities of Hungary (who
are Hungarian citizens), and the non-Hungarian citizens who feel attached to Hungarian
culture. The census of 2011 showed that in Hungary 314,000 people feel that next to
being Hungarians, they have other attachments as well. Also in this year, 2.1 million
people declared themselves Hungarian in the neighbouring countries, and approximately
460,000 Hungarians live throughout the world.9 (The population of Hungary was 9.982
million – in this case, the decrease of the population common to all the area was
alleviated by the immigration of Hungarians from neighbouring countries.)
In what follows, the social processes will be presented that resulted in strong
uncertainties regarding the maintenance of Hungarian national identity. This can be
considered a sort of a ‘narrative of losses’: the interpretation of the post-First World War
losses in territory and population as a ‘story of decadence’. All this has become a major
traumatic element of the Hungarian national consciousness.
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3. The Most Important Social Processes of the Last Few Decades
As Table 1 shows, during the past nine decades the number of Hungarians living in the
neighbouring states has decreased by 1 million. In 1910, the number of Hungarians
living in the territories annexed by the neighbouring states was 3,175,000, while in 2011
it was 2,100,000. The loss of population is unequivocal, even if one considers the data of
the 1910 census with the appropriate degree of criticism. This process is even more
obvious if one looks at the proportion of Hungarians who are not Hungarian citizens in
the Carpathian Basin: in 1910 it was 32.1%, while in 2001 it was 17.6%. According to
regions, in Transcarpathia, Vojvodina and Slovakia their ratio dropped from 1/3 to
approximately 1/10, while in Transylvania it diminished to 1/5 of the population. At the
same time one has to mention that the Central European states have become ethnically
more homogeneous, and this is true especially in the case of Hungary.15
The most important process affecting minority Hungarians during the last two decades
was a decrease of the population (600,000 people). The causes are presented in Table 2.
But ﬁrst of all one has to stress that in the history of Hungarian minorities, with the
exception of the last 10 years, demographic decrease was always connected to historical
cataclysms.16
This table shows that while the decrease of Hungarians in Romania is basically due to
natural causes and to migration (mostly to Hungary), in Slovakia the most important
cause is inter-generational nation switch, i.e. assimilation. This is ﬁrst of all the result of
mixed marriages, where approximately 2/3 of the offspring, when grown up, claim to be
part of the majority nation. In Serbia, the most important cause of the decline of the
Hungarian population was the exodus provoked by the Balkan war. The demographic
situation of the Hungarians in Ukraine is stable. The Hungarians in Austria can be
divided into two groups: the aging Hungarians in Burgenland (6000 people), and
immigrants from Hungary, Romania, and Serbia who settled in Vienna and surroundings.
According to prognoses, it is only here that a more serious increase can be expected. The
demographic decline in Hungary is alleviated by the immigration of Hungarians from the
neighbouring countries. The greatest decrease will be in the two smaller Hungarian
communities (Slovenia and Croatia), where more than 50–60% of the Hungarians live in
mixed marriages. In the next 20 years, the reduction of the Hungarian population will be
highest in Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia (60%, 50%, 31%); in Romania and Slovakia it
will be more moderate (20%, 18%); in Ukraine the decrease of 4% is lower than on the
national level; in Austria the number of Hungarians will increase sixfold (see Table 3).
In three countries (Slovenia, Croatia, Ukraine), the aging Hungarian population lives
in a mostly rural environment.23 But the other Hungarian minority communities are also
characterised by a re-evaluation of small towns and a kind of re-ruralisation. The latter
means that in all the regions inhabited by Hungarians outside Hungary the percentage of
the urban population (living in settlements with a population over 5000) decreased
drastically, and, in parallel, the population living in villages increased. Several towns,
considered to be regional centres, lost their Hungarian majority (Satu-Mare/Szatma´rne´meti,
Taˆrgu-Mures/Marosva´sa´rhely in Romania, Subotica/Szabadka in Serbia). The regions
with a majority Hungarian population24 are to a greater or lesser degree underdeveloped,
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Table 1. Hungarians in neighbouring countries: 1910–2011.10
1910 1930 1991 2001 2011
Burgenland
(Austria)
26,225 9% 10,442 3.5% 6763 2.8% 6641 2.4%
Slovakia11 884,309 30.2% 592,337 17.6% 567,296 11.5% 520,528 9.6% 458,467 8.5%
Transcarpathia
(Ukraine12)
184,108 30.6% 116,898 15.9% 155,71113 12.5% 151,516 12%
Vojvodina
(Serbia)
425,672 28.1% 376,176 23.2% 339,491 16.9% 290,207 14.2% 253,899 13%
Croatia 119,874 3.5% 66,040 1.7% 22,355 0.5% 16,595 0.4%
Prekmurje
(Slovenia)
20,737 23% 15,050 – 7637 8.5% 5386 6.5%
Transylvania
(Romania)
1653,943 31.7% 1,552,563 25.8% 1,603,900 20.8% 1,415,800 19.6% 1,224,937 18.9%
The table is based on data from censuses.14
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with unemployment rates higher than the national average. The Hungarian communities
of Burgenland, Prekmurje, and Croatia, are predominantly rural. In Transcarpathia
and Vojvodina the role of small towns, as compared with large ones, increased.
A similar resettlement of institutions from regional centres to provincial small towns can
be seen in Slovakia: the role of Sˇamorin/Somorja Kra´l’ovsky´ Chlmec/Kira´lyhelmec,
Dunajska Streda/Dunaszerdahely, and Komarno/Koma´rom, increased, while that of
Bratislava/Pozsony, and Kosice/Kassa decreased. In Romania the public role of the
traditional centres Cluj/Kolozsva´r, Oradea/Nagyva´rad, Taˆrgu-Mures-/Marosva´sa´rhely was
challenged by Sze´kelyland.
At the same time, more than half of the minority Hungarians lives in localities where
Hungarians are a majority (2001: Transylvania 56.6%; Slovakia 76.1%; Vojvodina
48.8%; Transcarpathia 61.9%). However, 10% of them live in scattered communities
Table 2. The causes of the decrease of the Hungarian minority communities between 1991–2011.17
Changes in the
population
(thousand)
Natural population
increase/decline
(thousand)
Migration balance
(thousand)
Assimilation
(thousand)
Territory 1991–2001–2011 1991–2001–2011 1991–2001–2011 1991–2001–2011
Transylvania –193/ –197 –100/ –60 –106/ –111 818/ –2019
Slovakia –47/ –63 –12/ –23 –2/ –15 –34/ –24
Vojvodina –50/ –40 –30/ –30 –5020/ –5 –5/ –5
Transcarpathia –4/ –9 –5/ –5 –4/ –2 521/ –2
Table 3. Changes in the number of the Hungarian population in the Carpathian Basin and
prognoses.22
Country/Year 1991 2001 2011 2021 1991–2021
In comparison
with national
trends
1991–2021
Austria 33,459 40,583 48,592 56,852 69.9% 11.32%
Croatia 22,355 16,595 11,106 7785 –65.1% –4.41%
Hungary 1,038,571 9,959,362 9,817,683 9,650,505 –4.8% –5.78%
Romania 1,624,959 1,431,807 1,258,110 1,089,495 –32.9% –12.18%
Serbia 343,942 293,299 242,365 208,341 –29% 2.24%
Slovakia 567,296 520,328 480,655 443,287 –14.8% 3.54%
Slovenia 8503 6243 4429 3453 –44.5% 6.54%
Ukraine 163,111 156,600 143,475 124,929 –20.2% –16.75%
Total 12,903,196 12,425,017 12,006,415 11,584,657 –10.2% –9.53%
Total without
Hungary
2,763,625 2,465,655 2,188,38 1,934,152 –30%
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(less than 10% of the population of the locality), where the possibilities for maintaining their
ethno-cultural identity are minimal (2001: Transylvania 8.5%; Slovakia 7.5%; Vojvodina
14.7%; Transcarpathia 14.1%).26 The country’s minority and Hungarian minorities policies
are most effective in maintaining Hungarian identity between the two poles, where, on a local
level, Hungarians are a minority, but nevertheless they are not a scattered community. Owing
to the expanding sphere of competence offered to local governments, in settlements with a
Hungarian majority the speciﬁc linguistic and institutional problems can be solved much
easier than where the local government is mostly Romanian.
A similar loss in social position can be noticed if one looks at the Hungarian minority
middle class. The Hungarian minority middle class becomes proportionally thinner, due
to emigration and the handicaps built into the national educational systems. Another
cause is historical: the lack of cultural, economic, and network capital before 1989
allowed only thin strata of the Hungarian minorities to enter the middle class.
Many urban, young, educated people were attracted by the better conditions offered in
Hungary or in Western Europe. While in secondary education the indicators referring to
Hungarians are only slightly below the national averages, among the professional classes
they are severely underrepresented, in spite of mass higher education. In this respect, the
situation is worst in Ukraine and Slovakia.
If one looks at the distribution of occupations according to economic sectors, in
Slovakia and Vojvodina the Hungarians are overrepresented in agriculture and sylvi-
culture (in Slovakia the national average is 7%, among Hungarians 13%). In industry the
situation is more balanced. On the other hand, in the service sector in Romania and
Voivodina the Hungarian minority is underrepresented. Especially so in the area of
ﬁnancial and economic services, where the proportion of Hungarians is 2/3 of their
national proportion. As far as administration, home affairs and defence are concerned, it
is only half of the national proportion.
The difﬁculties of ethno-cultural reproduction can be seen most clearly in the
appearance of scattered communities without their own institutions, and in mixed mar-
riages. Over the past two decades the role of multiple (linguistic, cultural, national)
attachments has continually increased. A scattered community means not only a decrease
in the number of Hungarians in a particular region or locality, but also that as a result
people will not be able to maintain the institutions where they can use their mother
tongue. This will be limited to private life, it increases the chance of a mixed marriage,
and in most cases leads to the assimilation of the offspring. During the past decades the
Table 4. The proportion of Hungarians within the urban population in 200125
Urban population (%)
The percentage of
Hungarian urban population (%)
Transylvania 56.2 52.7
Slovakia 56.1 38.5
Vojvodina 55.6 58.2
Transcarpathia 36.7 35.4
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Table 5. The population of Romania, Slovakia, Serbia and Ukraine, respectively the Hungarian minorities, according to school qualiﬁcations (data of the
2001 or 2002 census).27
Qualiﬁcations
Romania Slovakia Serbia/Vojvodina Ukraine
(ISCED) Total % Hungarians Total Hungarians Total Hungarians Total Hungarians
Primary education (1,2 A) 47.7 49.3 26.4 36.3 41.3 53.9 31.5 40
Upper secondary education 15.3 17.7 29.4 30.1 52.6 53.2
(3 C)
Secondary-with ﬁnal examination 21.4 21.6 32.1 26.3 43.9 37.6
(3 A, 3 B)
College, university 10.0 7.8 9.8 5.4 9.4 6.1 12.4 5.2
(5,6)
Uneducated or unknown 5.7 3.7 2.4 1.3 7.8 2.2 3.5 1.6
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
H
ungarian
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om
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unities
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537
Table 6. The distribution of employment according to economic sectors in Romania, Slovakia and Vojvodina (2001).
Romania Vojvodina Slovakia28
Economic sector Total Hungarian Total Hungarian Total Hungarian
Primary sector Agriculture, pisciculture, sylviculture 27.1 17.6 23.3 33.6 7 13
Secondary sector Mining 1.9 1.9 0.5 0.3
Manufacturing industry 24.2 34.7 26.7 27.9
Energy industry 2.3 2.1 1.4 1.6
Building industry 6.2 7 4.8 4.9
Total 34.7 45.6 33.5 34.7 42.4 39.4
Tertiary sector Trade (retail and wholesale) 10.5 12.4 13.2 9.9
Hotel and catering 5 4.8 2.4 1.6
Transport and communication 1.9 1.3 5.2 3.3
Banking and ﬁnancial services 3.6 2.6 4.1 2.4
Administration, home affairs, defence 5.7 3.2 4.6 2.3
Education 4.8 5.4 4.6 4.0
Health 4.2 4.3 6.0 5.5
Other services 2.2 2.6 3.0 2.4
Private household 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1
Total 38.2 36.8 43.2 31.7 50.6 47.6
Sources: census, 2001, 2002
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proportion of mixed marriages has somewhat increased. In Slovakia the proportion of
Hungarian-Slovak mixed marriages was 15.5% in 1980, while today it is approximately
20%.29 In Romania, the proportion of Hungarians living in mixed marriages was 12.5%
in 2001. In the case of the Hungarians in Serbia, the proportion is much higher. In 2009 it
was 29.73%.30
The self-identiﬁcation of children from mixed marriages is the most important factor
of assimilation. In Transylvania and Vojvodina approximately two thirds identify with
the majority ethnic group, while in Slovakia this is approximately 80%. The high pro-
portion of mixed marriages in Slovakia is due to the fact that – in spite of the fact that
Hungarians are a majority in the area – the social and cultural distance between the two
ethnic groups is the smallest here. The switch of identity can be explained by the fact that
within the Hungarian minority the prestige of majority social-cultural positions is very
high, and many think that identiﬁcation with the ethnic-linguistic group of the majority
will enhance their social mobility.31
In the localities and areas where the proportion of mixed marriages is around 50–60%,
the long-term existence of Hungarian communities becomes problematic. In this respect,
the most affected are the Hungarians who live in scattered communities, respectively
larger towns. (For example in Romania Maramures, Arad, Timis county, or Croatia,
Slovenia.) Socially, the most neglected groups are the Hungarians who are labourers and
live in housing estates.
The problem of the Roma communities with Hungarian attachments came to the fore
during the past decades. In this respect, the most important issue is the Roma pre-
ponderance in the Hungarian institutions in Eastern Slovakia, and parallel to this the
appearance of regional underclass groups. In Slovakia the proportion of Roma who claim to
be Hungarian is reckoned to be around 12.5%, with some 65,000 people. In Transylvania the
proportion is 6.5%, almost 90,000 people. In Transcarpathia it is 9%, i.e. 14,000 people, out
of a population of 32,000 Roma.32 It is an increasing problem in the Hungarian minority
school system that Hungarian parents prefer to send their children to majority schools
because of the Roma. On the other hand, in the areas and localities inhabited by Hungarians,
some Roma groups appear that do not speak Hungarian and are not integrated into the local
society. This leads to an increasing number of Hungarian-Roma conﬂicts.33
Since the middle of the 1990s, the socialisation of younger generations in the
neighbouring countries takes place basically in a Hungarian media space. They watch or
listen to Hungarian television and radio stations, and read web pages from Hungary.34
Consequently, learning the majority language becomes increasingly difﬁcult in primary
and secondary schools, especially in areas where Hungarians form a majority. Further-
more, they are socialised in a virtual reality constructed mainly in Budapest, and from
which the culture and the public life of the majority are almost absent. As a result, of
consuming the Hungarian media, and due to its opinion forming inﬂuence on them, they
consider Hungary their own country and expect the Hungarian institutions to treat them
on a par with Hungarian citizens, although, in fact, they are treated like Romanian,
Slovakian, etc, citizens. In parallel, due to the overwhelming importance of the media
from Hungary, hardly any public forums have sprung up in the particular regions
themselves. In most cases the political elite of the minorities tries to send its messages
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through media channels from Hungary. (Duna TV was established exactly in order to
inform Hungarians over the border. Later, all the more important public or commercial
television channels made their appearance on the Transylvanian media market.)35
After 1989, the Hungarian minority communities went through a huge process
of revitalisation, and nowadays they have several thousand educational and cultural
institutions.36 However, after experiencing some of the processes previously discussed,
in many respects they reﬂect on their fate as if it were a story of decline. They are not
sure how they will be able to maintain and/or develop their regional ethno-cultural com-
munities. Therefore, based on the results achieved in the past 20 years, the project of building
‘a minority Hungarian society’ and ‘the loss narrative’ exist side by side in Hungarian public
thinking. In other words, the demographic and social processes and the assimilation doctrines
of the majority nations made the minority Hungarian public opinion uncertain about minority
Hungarians staying in their respective homelands.
This insecurity, this existential fear, determines the self-image of minority Hungarians,
their image of the future, their own and their children’s life strategies. With regional
differences and stresses, this image is marked by worries over the future of the community,
by the relationship between the majority and the minority. All this then becomes part of
public life in Hungary too, and has repercussions on inter-state relationships.
4. The Minority Problem in Hungary and the Changing Images
of the Future
The main goals formulated in the programmes elaborated by the Hungarian minority
communities after 198937:
(a) Hungarian should receive the status of a regionally ofﬁcial language.
(b) They want to organise their educational and cultural life themselves. They
claim to have the right to control their educational system. In cultural life,
they claim ﬁnancing proportional with the institutions of the majority, and
insist on free institutional development.
(c) The administrative division of the respective country or region should allow
most Hungarians to live in administrative units dominated by Hungarians.
(d) The development of the regions inhabited by Hungarians should not lag behind
that of the other regions. On the other hand, state development should not
destroy the structure of the localities or change the ethnic proportions.
(e) The symbols of the Hungarian minority should become ofﬁcial. By this the
state would give a symbolic sign of respect to this minority’s national dignity.
(f) There should be political representation on all levels (national, regional,
local). They regularly formulate the claim to be part of the government.
(g) In Hungary they expect to be considered on an equal footing with the
Hungarian citizens, and claim equal, institutionally ensured opportunities in
educational and cultural life.
After 1989, all these requests were supplemented by national autonomy, a concept
elaborated by the Hungarian minority elites, aiming at the position of a ‘partner nation’.
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First, this was a vision of political integration (an ideological expectation and a political
slogan) within minority communities organised on a national platform. Second, its
institutionalisation has been seen as a bulwark serving a regional and ethnic equilibrium.
Third, the institutional system imposed by ‘autonomy’ was supposed to alleviate the
drawbacks of minority existence. The slogan encouraging people to remain in their
homeland became empty by the turn of the millennium, since it turned out that Hungary
was not able to provoke major changes within the social processes affecting the minority
communities. In 2004, the campaign preceding the referendum on double citizenship
questioned the image of a ‘virtual fatherland’ and brought to light the difﬁculties
involved by immigration and individual emancipation in Hungary.
During the past two decades, that is since 1989, three basic strategies were developed
for Hungarian minorities policy. None of them can be connected exclusively to the right
or the left wing in politics.
The ﬁrst strategy stressed the protection of national minorities: besides references to
international norms, models, its basic statement was the following: one should ﬁrst create
good relations with the respective state, and only after that can one manage the problems of
minority Hungarians. This deﬁned the policy of the Basic Treaties, in which the mixed
minority committees were expected to offer solutions to the problems. It is equally important
in this strategy that the respective minority community should ﬁnd solutions to its problems
within its own state. This pertains especially if the local Hungarian party forms part of the
neighbouring country government. Hungary’s tools in this case are mostly diplomatic.
Another aspect is the economic and social strengthening of the Hungarian minority societies:
self-government should be realised by their own independent institutions. This strategy was
mostly typical of the Hungarian minorities policy of the left wing governments, doubled by
an anti-nationalist rhetoric (criticising symbolic politics, national rhetoric).38
The second strategy, that of the ideology of the uniﬁcation of the nation, has as
its starting point the unity of the Hungarian nation over the borders, and this can be
institutionalised by breaking down the borders of the nation state (integration into the
European Union). From this standpoint, Hungarian minority societies are part of the
Hungarian nation, but living in other countries. The Hungarian Permanent Conference
symbolised the political unity of the Hungarian ethno-cultural community, while the
Hungarian Certiﬁcate connected the individual to the Hungarian state.39
The idea of the contractual nation intends to institutionalise the divergent paths of
development and the representation of the speciﬁc interests of the Hungarian regional
communities living in eight countries. It states that the Hungarian government should
formulate its speciﬁc relationship to each regional community separately. This means that
the Hungarian government should determine its relationship with each regional com-
munity, and the regional minority elites should also determine their vision and clarify
what they expect/can expect from Hungary.40 As a continuation of the previous idea of
the nation, this vision wishes to see the territories inhabited by Hungarians as a common
political space. According to this view, the Hungarian elites from the neighbouring
countries should put their agenda into brackets if wider geopolitical interests are at stake,
or those of a European party family. In the idea of national uniﬁcation without changing
the borders, symbolic politics are characteristic mostly of right wing politicians.
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The third strategy, based on the goal of integration into the European Union, puts the
stress on regionalisation, hoping that the common regional interests will override ethnic
divisions.41 Policymakers see the possibilities of minority integration in the development
of regions along the borders and the regionalisation of the countries. In order to achieve
this, they want to create regions of development, cross-border regions according to local
needs, to historical and ethnic preconditions. Some think that these regions could give
birth to the autonomous regional institutions that are necessary for maintaining national
identity against the interference of the nation state.
Next to these three strategic models, there are two more points of view. One considers
that after the unsuccessful attempts at autonomy during the 1990s, one should con-
centrate on participation in the work of the foreign government in question, since this is
the most efﬁcient way of defending minority interests.42 Another approach, never
assumed openly in Hungary, says that in 50 years, due to demographic and migratory
processes, the number of Hungarians in the neighbouring countries will decrease to a
point when the whole issue will become irrelevant.
The most important statements of Hungarian minorities policy will be presented on
the basis of the party and government programmes developed in Hungary.
(a) The principle of non-violence. Hungarian minorities have never resorted to
violence in defence of their interests.
(b) The right to be part of the universal Hungarian community. Consequently,
minority community Hungarians should have the right to free, unobstructed
connections with this larger Hungarian community.
(c) One should change not the place, but the quality of the borders. This principle
on the one hand rejects revisionism, and on the other hand reinterprets the idea
of the border as such. In most cases, this is part of the idea of integration into
the European Union. However, in the case of two regions (Transcarpathia and
Vojvodina) the Schengen borders bring about new limitations.
(d) Equality of rights is possible through the rights of local governments.
(e) In order to maintain the identity of Hungarians living in the neighbouring
states as incomplete societies and as independent political communities,
they are entitled to an autonomous institutional system.
(f) The principle that the representatives of Hungarian minority politics should
be treated equally.
(g) The representation of the interests of the Hungarians from the neighbouring
countries in international forums, within the framework of international
norms, is the duty of the current Hungarian government.
(h) The support of the Hungarians in the neighbouring states is a permanent
budget item of the Hungarian budget.43
5. The Hungarian Governments’ Strategies Regarding
Hungarian Minorities
Ofﬁcially, during the past 20 years, the key element in Hungarian-Hungarian relations
was securing equality of opportunity for minority Hungarians, and so the stress fell on
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facilitating cooperation. The difﬁculties of such partnerships, of the actual experiences of
them, and of recreating the boundaries of the communities are hardly mentioned.
The image of the ‘Hungarian from Hungary’ made its way into the Hungarian minority
media around the middle of the 1990s, associated with critiques of Hungarian politics,
institutions, and national carelessness. (Among others, mention should here be made
of the opinions of Ka´roly D. Balla, Be´la Bı´ro´, A´gota Grendel, La´szlo´ Ve´gel.) Criticism
became generalised after the referendum on dual citizenship.44 However, beyond
sociological and socio-linguistic investigations, the differences between Hungary and the
Hungarian minority communities have not been researched. Here is not the place for such
an analysis, but a few historical guidelines are necessary.
Seen from Hungary, the consequence of the treaty of Trianon is the amputation of the
country and the appearance of a revisionist vision of the future and a cult trying to redress
the situation. Indirectly, after 1918, Hungarian nation building enters into a mindset centred
on restoration, its vantage point being again and again the investigation of the mistakes that
led to the dissolution of historical Hungary. However, by now public opinion in Hungary
has accepted this historical situation – the number of those who still wish a revision of
borders is minimal (according to opinion polls, 1–3%).45 So, the question is part of the past,
but as a cultural code it has become part of the Hungarian politics of memory and identity.
On the other hand, for the Hungarian minorities Trianon means the origin of their
present-day condition, since it was this decision that changed the citizenship of their
ancestors.46 And this reminds them of being defenceless, subordinated to political power.
This is connected to the greatest burden of the minority situation: the existential fear and
insecurity concerning the future of one’s community. It always depends on the feeling
of familiarity, deﬁned by historical experiences.47 Since minority communities do not
experience simply political abuse of power, but the will to national supremacy, the question
arises again and again whether it is possible to live a digniﬁed human life as a minority.48 At
the same time, in all seven countries concerned, the Hungarian minorities have accepted this
historical situation and live their lives under these conditions. Their social communities and
institutions are mostly organised on a (national) linguistic-cultural basis. Their identity is
essentially deﬁned by their belonging to the Hungarian community, while for a Hungarian
in Hungary this is taken for granted. Consequently, in all programs of nation building the
Hungarians from neighbouring countries can be presented as examples.
So, while for the Hungarians living in Hungary the treaty of Trianon pertains to
history, to the politics of memory, for those living in the neighbouring states it is the
starting point of their existence. The two approaches are connected when one tries to
institutionalise the Hungarian ethno-cultural community. Both groups have accepted the
present-day situation, and in this case the only possible goal is to bracket the trauma:
manage the inequalities of opportunity, and introduce through education, media, the
values, the knowledge of the Hungarian minority communities into a common Hungarian
thesaurus. By this, the Carpathian Basin can become a common homeland in which
Hungarians possess wide ranging regional information.49
Hungary is ethnically the most homogeneous state in the region. In a certain sense, it
is the ideal of the nation builder of the neighbouring states, since in Hungary the
nationalities do not form an independent political community, and feel attached to the
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Hungarian state and culture. This is to a large degree the result of the processes of
assimilation after 1920 and 1944, of the slow disappearance of church and educational
institutions, of exchanges of population and deportations. Still, there is a major difference
between the Hungarian minority communities and the nationalities of Hungary: the
nationalities of Hungary have never lived in compact areas (while more than half of the
Hungarians in the neighbouring countries live in localities where they form the local
majority); the most important groups, the Germans and the Slovaks do not live in areas
bordering the kin-state. The minorities of Hungary have not taken part in the nation
building of their kin-states. Their movements were inﬂuenced by modernisation in
nineteenth- and twentieth-century Hungary. The ancestors of the Hungarians from the
neighbouring countries were part of collective experiences such as the revolution of
1848, until 1918 of Hungarian nation building, and then between 1938 and 1944 a
generation socialised in a minority condition became a majority again.
Contemporary Hungarian minority communities are basically bilingual. This means
that for most of them cultural pluralism is an everyday experience. The population
of Hungary is mostly monolingual, and does not have many experiences of cultural
pluralism, and of parallel cultures living side by side. The Hungarian political elite, due
to its traditionally aufkla¨rist mentality, would like to present its own country as a
homogeneous society, in spite of the fact that putting linguistic uniformity aside, there are
signiﬁcant regional and social inequalities. The predisposition to see society as homo-
geneous tends to construct Hungarian minorities, and the whole Hungarian ethno-cultural
community, as a uniﬁed entity as well. The image thus formed of the ‘Hungarian from
the neighbouring countries’ stresses both originality and underdevelopment.
Uniﬁcation suggests that any phenomenon, any situation that does not replicate a
preconceived image should be seen as a dangerous destruction of the community. While
some phenomena that affect all of Hungary also receive attention when it comes to
minorities, for example the publicity given to the conﬂicts of interests within minority
political life, or to the power games of politicians, other phenomena never enter into the
image created of minorities.
Another important mentality widespread in Hungary is that Hungarians can see their
situation, their problems only from within, without the ability to see themselves from a
wider, external perspective. While, for somebody living in a minority situation, this latter
approach, due to the permanent presence of cultural difference, is taken for granted.
It is part of the vision of the future, of the expectations of Hungarians from the
neighbouring countries to beneﬁt in Hungary from the same treatment as Hungarian
citizens. While being in the kin-state they step out of the minority condition, and want to
be part of a majority society. However, they are still the citizens of another country. In
this case, they become particularly sensitive when Hungarian citizens adopt the position
of the member of a ‘majority’ towards them, or show a complete lack of knowledge
about their condition (‘where did you learn Hungarian so well?’). The latter situation is
less and less probable, since with every generation the number of people with Hungarian
friends, relatives in neighbouring countries increases, and there are more and more
people returning to Hungary with tourist experiences. Contact situations are increasingly
a part of everyday life, but often this also involves conﬂicts: in circumstances of
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competition, of conﬂict of interests, the Hungarian from the neighbouring countries
becomes an immigrant,50 an employee, an entrepreneur, etc. Then the stereotypes start to
work: the ‘Romanian’, the ‘Yugo’, the ‘Slovak’, etc.
The greatest misunderstanding around dual citizenship is that while Hungarians from
the neighbouring countries consider it a possibility for emancipation, in Hungary this is
seen as a tool of identity, party politics, and at the same time a solution to the minority
problem. And in the meantime the right to vote offered to the dual citizens from the
neighbouring countries leads to heated debates in the Hungarian public sphere.51
While for most Hungarian citizens the fatherland and the borders of the country are
identical, for Hungarians from the neighbouring countries the two concepts are different.
For most of them, the fatherland is not the state in which they live, but their homeland
(otthon: the region, area where they live their everyday lives), permeated with a strong
sense of belonging to the Hungarian nation. This is a sort of virtual image of the
fatherland/the Hungarian nation/Hungary. This is why the issue of Hungarians living in
the neighbouring states provokes such sensitive reactions in Hungary.
Usually, within their own communities, Hungarians from the neighbouring countries
are not minorities. In everyday life it is the routines, habits, local particularities that deﬁne
their existence, and not the politicised, nationalised stereotypes with which they are identiﬁed
in Hungary. Generally, in their countries, minority Hungarians are just ‘Hungarians’, and
they become ‘Transylvanian’, ‘from Vojvodina’, or ‘from Upland’ in Hungary.
Consequently, virtualisation is mutual within the Hungarian cultural community:
for Hungarians from the neighbouring countries, the common fatherland is the common
Hungarian cultural space (while they are the citizens of a different country), while
Hungarian citizens endow with nobility the Hungarian minorities’ life situations, stres-
sing Hungarian language and culture (while for the minorities this is taken for granted).
As a result, the members of the two groups consider themselves much closer socially
and culturally than they actually are, and this comes to the surface in concrete situations of
cooperation. In the latter case, the status identities (different citizenships, socialisation in
different educational systems, membership of different legal, habitual structures of national
cultures, and so on.) become at least as important as representations of cultural identity.
Due to the peculiarities of the regime change in Hungary, in constructions of civic and
local identity the concept of ‘national unity’ refers ﬁrst of all to the communities of
Hungarians from the neighbouring countries. This is due to the fact that in Hungary the
two dominant communities of identity politics, the right and the left wing, are built upon
discourses that try to mutually exclude each other. But within the idea of a citizens’
community, the responsibility of the Hungarian state toward the Hungarians from
the neighbouring countries has a central role. That is, toward a group that is not even
under the jurisdiction of the Hungarian state. In everyday practice, the nationalising
symbolisations basically build on Sze´kely, Transylvanian elements, and turning regional
traditions into national ones (e.g. the Sze´kely gate).
Then there is the problem of equality and compensation. Since 1989 all Hungarian
governments have declared that in questions referring to the Hungarians from neigh-
bouring countries they would never take decisions without them and against them.
However, this principle was neglected when the basic treaties were signed. It has been a
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dilemma for 90 years already whether in Hungarian minorities policy and in minority
policy it is the Hungarian state’s general interests and experiences that should prevail, or
the standpoint of the given minority community?
For example, after the fruitless debates concerning Hungarian university education in
Transylvania, Slovakia, and Ukraine, the Hungarian government took the initiative. But
the construction and the everyday functioning is the task of the local institutions.
However, the questions remain: next to the issue of accreditation, who decides over the
paths of development? Does the Hungarian government have any right to control these
universities, and how?
The same problems arise in the case of the Status Law, the dual citizenship, or the
reorganisation of support policies. Mostly in situations of resource allocation, a conﬂict
appeared between the ‘taxpayer’ and the ‘victim’. These roles came into being as a reaction
to asymmetric positions. The ﬁrst refers to the Hungarian government, which can refer to
their taxes (requesting efﬁcient usage), or that they are responsible for spending the
resources properly. The second is the minority Hungarian who may think that this support
is his due, as a compensation from Hungarians to whom history was kinder.
In this case, the unequal position is even more pronounced than in the majority-
minority relationship. Probably an important step in this direction would be the
de-politicisation of support from Hungary.
The crucial question is whether one can reﬂect on the changes that occurred in
Hungarian-Hungarian relationships during the past decades. This present paper tried to
analyse these problems in a discourse that did not focus on the nation or the politics of
history. Instead, it focused on processes, interests and functionality.
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